This article analyzes two cases of environmental advocacy initiatives in China:
The policy advocacy coalition framework (ACF) has been developed to explain policymaking processes and policy change and learning by examining interactive structures among major players who express their interests, beliefs, and actions in certain socio-economic contexts (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009) . Scholars have adopted an ACF for studying issues related to environmental policy-making (van Overveld, Hermans, & Verliefde, 2010) , natural resource and ecological policies (Sotirov & Memmler, 2012; Weible, Pattison, & Sabatier, 2010) , climate change (Bortree, Ahern, Dou, & Smith, 2011) , and environmental justice (Kreger, Sargent, Arons, Standish, & Brindis, 2011) . They have pointed out the difficulties and importance of obtaining knowledge of the goals and perceptions of numerous stakeholders in a multitude of scientific, political, economic, and social settings over a long periods of time (Sabatier, 2007) . Environmental governance, similarly, takes places in a wide context in which stakeholders, including government agencies, civil society, and transnational organizations, seek to articulate their interests through both formal and informal means, to manage and conserve natural resources, to control pollution, and to resolve conflicts (W. Li, 2006, p. 10506 ).
This article aims to advance our understanding of the major actors, their claims, and their strategies for advocating environmental interests China where special interest politics is not salient, and where core beliefs are being constantly redefined alongside rapid social transformation (Pan, 2008) . It is not evident who the environmental stakeholders in China are, especially since pressure groups are almost invisible unless directly faced with a contentious issue. Instead of focusing on established environmental organizations, therefore, I choose to examine two initiatives, namely, institutionalizing environmental information transparency nationally, and sanctioning industrial environmental violations regionally. Both initiatives are aimed at balancing environmental interests with other competing goals such as economic growth. By analyzing the Chinese case, the paper contributes to the literature on policymaking processes and advocacy coalition framework originally developed in a western country context where pluralism and organized special interest advocacy are a regular form of political life. 1 The next section reviews the changes in Chinese society that demand the articulation of environmental interests. Section 3 analyzes two cases where government and intellectual elites formed coalitions to advocate environmental policy change from within the system. Section 4 describes situations where the public resorted to extra-institutional channels for articulating their interests in regard to specific government environmental decisions. Based on the case analysis, the paper discusses the two major motivations for advocating environmental interests in China -value-based advocacy for systematic change and balancing interests in government decision-making. The conclusion seeks to place the discussion in the paper in the broader context of the literature on advocacy coalition framework as well as changes in administration and society in China.
Social Changes and the Articulation of Environmental Interests
Even though since 1972 China has followed international practice and enacted environmental laws and regulations, there has been concern about local implementation and motivating local authorities to prioritize environmental protection over other considerations. With industrialization, air and water pollution has drawn the attention of both experts and the top leadership in China. Since 1977, higher education institutions have launched study programmes in environmental science and engineering to train professionals. During the 6 th , 7 th , and 8 th Five-Year plan periods (1981 -1995 , environmental scientists and engineers worked on pollution prevention and control technologies. 2 In 1996, the first year of the 9 th Five-Year plan, there was an increase in reports on pollution control and environmental protection in the media and a rise in the number of national development guidelines. The State
Council issued its Decisions on Issues on Environmental Protection in 1996 (The State
Council of China, 2006) . In the same year, combating acid rain and controlling water pollution in the major rivers and lakes such as Huai, Hai, and Liao River and Tai and Chao Lake were included in the 9 th Five-Year Plan. The central government adopted a campaign approach for achieving its policy goals. For example, to curb water pollution in the Huai River caused by small township-village enterprises, the central government launched the "Midnight" campaign in 1997 to conduct surprise check on the listed fifteen highly polluting industries (Almond, Chen, Greenstone, & Li, 2009) . The "Control One, Meet Two Standards" campaign was also initiated in 1997 to control sulfur dioxide emissions so that total SO 2 discharges could meet national standards and ambient air quality could meet standards in functional areas (State Environmental Protection Administration, 1996) . News reporters with major newspapers and magazines were invited to join the "Midnight" campaign to expose serious water pollution cases and violators. This was a significant development as pollution had been mainly considered a technical issue and discussed only among experts and high level policy-makers.
It was not until 1996 that environmental protection started to draw media and public attention.
Historically, advocates for environmental interests have been a few officials of environmental agencies, academics, leaders of environmental non-governmental organizations better articulated than environmental interests in society (Bailey, 2007; Schachter & Liu, 2005) . In the face of such constraints, environmental information disclosure has become a "third-wave" of environmental regulation, after command-and-control and economic policy instruments, and is considered especially useful for developing countries where the resources and capacity for government enforcement are lacking (Tietenberg & Wheeler, 1998; Wheeler, 2000) . Enhancing environmental information transparency and sanctioning industrial environmental violations are considered necessary for bridging the institutional gaps to provide concerned parties with better evidence and enforcement tools to articulate their environmental interests (W. . Thus, as the cases will illustrate in the next section, both intellectual and government elites have been pushing for such systemic changes in the environmental governance in China.
At the same time, the Chinese public has become increasingly aware of environmental problems in their daily lives. In western democracies such as the United States, NGOs have played a pivotal role in relating environmental issues to fundamental regime values such as the sanctity of life, freedom and equity. Organized environmental interests could effectively compete with other interest groups to shape public policies and compel the government to enact and enforce environmental laws (Coglianese, 2001; Rose, 2000) . In China, however, the articulation of environmental interests as they affect the grassroots tends to be issue-focused and sporadic.
Systemic changes in environmental governance could only be achieved by elites who share common environmental values, have access to state actors, and can influence government policy-making (Wang, 2008) . The two cases presented below will illustrate this point.
Institutionalizing Environmental Information Disclosure in China
Owing to technical nature of environmental issues and the paternalistic tradition of public administration in China, the policy agenda has been under the strict control of government officials and their advisors (Wang, 2008) . In the late 1990s, international organizations started to pay attention to industrial pollution control in developing countries and to form coalitions with domestic policy entrepreneurs to advocate national environmental policy change. This 'epistemic community' was comprised of legal professionals, economists, political leaders, bureaucrats, and business leaders who considered environmental information disclosure a useful tool for developing countries to achieve low cost pollution control as well as democracy (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000) . An expert team of the World Bank took the initiative to promote the new paradigm of industrial pollution control among Asian developing countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and China (Afsah, LaPlante, & Wheeler, 1996 enterprises from the best to the worst and then to disclose the rating results via the mass media, which in turn would encourage the public to get involved in helping to keep industry clean (Wangenheim, 2004 The coalition was successful in pushing forward the following two instrumental objectives:
(1) utilizing advanced information technology for upgrading environmental management techniques, and (2) compensating the less optimal environmental monitoring and enforcement capacity of EPBs by means of public scrutiny of polluters. Members of the coalition shared environmental values as well as democratic values such as transparency and public participation. In a situation where economic growth dominated the national agenda, the following strategies were adopted to mobilize support from government and intellectual elites:
(1) preaching and prescription through the focus on international experiences backed up by the reputation of the World Bank, and (2) persuasion through communication with government officials who were possibly more biased toward development, bringing to their attention the reality of environmental challenges. It only took about two years for the coalition to change local policies in Zhenjiang but about ten years to bring about national policy change.
Sanctioning Industrial Environmental Violations in Chongqing
Weak enforcement of environmental regulations has been a major cause of industrial pollution in China. The "Three Synchronizations" (also called "three simultaneous steps") in the 1989
Environmental Protection Law were designed to deal with new sources of pollution. They require that (1) the design, (2) the construction, and (3) the operation of a new industrial enterprise (or an existing factory expanding or changing its operations) be synchronized with the design, construction, and operation of an appropriate (end-of-pipe) pollution treatment facility. Moreover, an environmental impact assessment (EIA) report must be completed before a facility is granted a construction permit by a competent economic development authority (Laffont & Tirole, 1991) . The rate of implementation of three synchronizations and Even when violations of rules and regulations are identified, the level of penalty is often inadequate to act as a deterrent. The pollution discharge fees were so low that it was economically rational for industries to pollute rather than to address the problem. According to one account, the operating cost of wastewater treatment in one highly polluting industry was around 1.2-1.8 RMB per ton. The fixed investment in wastewater treatment facility was 100 million RMB for the 150 ton per day alkali-recycling equipment used in the paper and pulp industry. But the maximum fine on wastewater discharge was only 100,000 RMB, making it more rational for the industry to pay the fine rather than to treat the pollution (Kim & Lee, 2006) .
In an effort to deal with this problem, the Chongqing People's Congress revised its In the past, if a violation had been identified, no matter how long a polluter remained noncompliant only one violation could be counted and the polluter could only be fined once at the maximum amount prescribed by law. Now the Chongqing EPB can multiply that amount by the number of non-compliant days of "one" violation. According to the account by the director of the Chongqing bureau of environmental supervision under the Chongqing EPB, on the first day when the revised decree became effective on September 1, 2007, enforcement officers issued an administrative order requesting the violator to comply by September 3. When the enforcement officers revisited the plant on September 3, they found no corrections were made.
The officers explained to the plant manager the terms of the new Article 111. The manager immediately asked his colleagues to take necessary measures to meet environmental standards (Lawson & Xu, 2007) . Despite being successfully adopted and implemented in Chongqing, the "fine by day" rule was only adopted by other two municipalities in China, Beijing and Shenzhen. Scholars have been advocating that the revised Environmental Protection Law and Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law should also include such a clause. Unfortunately, the National People's Congress did not agree to this proposal. Industries have a high stake in the matter and they have clearly expressed a preference for maintaining the status quo (W. Xu & Yuan, 2010) . In spite of this, it can be argued that some progress has been made in small coalitions comprising an international environmental NGO, environmental officials at both central and local levels of government, and legislators have successfully advanced local environmental interests.
Conclusions
This article has analyzed two cases of advocating environmental interests in China:
institutionalizing environmental information transparency and sanctioning environmental
violations. There exist in China both policy coalitions advocating systematic changes from within the system and ad hoc pressure groups which attempt to persuade the government to allow them a voice in policy changes which would address their grievances. The public perceived there was a need in some instances, especially decisions made on locally unwanted development projects, to go to extra-institutional channels to articulate their environmental
interests. The cases demonstrate the difficulties encountered by ACF theorists in answering the following questions: how to identify the geographical and temporal scopes of a policy issue, how to delineate the composition of advocacy coalitions and members' core beliefs and policy beliefs, what strategies have been adopted to compete with rival coalitions and form collective actions, and how to develop a causal link between external events and changes occurred in policy subsystems (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) .
Environmental information transparency and sanctioning environmental violators are policy issues of national significance. Both exhibit evidence of policy learning by Chinese technocrats from well-established environmental institutions in western countries, under the schemes of collaborative scientific research. The advocacy coalition in the former instance was at a national level but the later only at a regional level. This could probably be explained in terms of (1) the difference in status of the World Bank and the EDF, which could account for their varied accesses to the Chinese central government; and (2) the difference in the potential threat of the two initiatives to industrial interests. Consequently, disclosing industrial pollution information was adopted as a national policy but fining non-compliant polluters by day was adopted in only three localities in China. This shows that political actors are confined by resources at their disposal and do not necessarily form coalitions of an optimal geographical coverage for the policy issue to be adequately addressed.
Furthermore, political actors in these cases did not have shared core beliefs but focused their attention on single issues. Neither the policy coalitions nor the pressure groups continued to exist after the issues were addressed. The advocates for environmental interests had to compete with economic interests for policy change but the dominant policy and social discourses were on GDP growth, income generation and individual success. Competing values such as sustainability, equity, and public participation were still very much at the peripheries.
Dramatic external events such as the Songhua River incident facilitated the shift of environmental issues to mainstream national policy-making but it takes a long time to cultivate environmental and social values among the general Chinese public.
The Chinese government's desire for modernization and advancement has opened up more political space for alternative policy-making mechanisms as well as for articulating environmental interests in society. Environmentally conscious elites have mainly targeted at key decision-makers to deliver changes from within the system while those members of the public who have been harmed by environmental pollution have resorted to extra-institutional channels. In the final analysis, the boundaries of political space are drawn by the politically powerful groups and they do not allow for public contest. The initiatives discussed in this article are ultimately consistent with the actions of an authoritarian government which believes that the pursuit of the public interest, of which protecting the environment is one area, should emanate from the government rather than the public.
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Financial support from the City University of Hong Kong (Project #7008072) is gratefully acknowledged. Notes 1. Social organization and association are not encouraged in China. Even farmers, for example, who share a common professional interest have not yet formed their own national association (Chen & Xu, 2011) . 2. More information is available at http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/env/6313/index.html 3. PROPER is a World Bank research project in collaboration with Indonesia's Environmental Impact and Management Agency (BAPEDAL). This project was intended to overcome pervasive institutional barriers to environmental enforcement by creating "incentives for compliance through honor and shame" (Afsah and Ratunanda 1999) . PROPER was terminated after 1997 because of the Asian financial crisis and political instability in Indonesia. 4. Interview with Dr. Hua Wang in 2004. 5. Director Chu was a strong advocate of environmental information transparency. He said, "Environmental information should be made public no matter whether they convey good news or bad news. There is nothing that can be hidden forever. Air, water, and land are so openly accessible and so indispensable to people's lives. Government should make environmental information publicly available!" 6. By contrast, the Hohhot Research Academy of Environmental Sciences (HRAES) had to subsume the project under the Hohhot EPB's "Control One, Meet Two Standards" campaign against air pollution. The implementation team was limited to members of HRAES and the project was never endorsed by the Hohhot city government (W. .
